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Michael
Lind, a FNew America
Foundation, in the May edition of Politico Magazine, offers
us a description of our current politics and then serves up a vision of
what the politics of the intermediate future looks like.
ellow at the centrist
Lind’s big
idea is that we’ve reached the end of a period of partisan realignment that
began in the early 1960s in which the Democrats became a “coalition of
relatively upscale whites with racial and ethnic minorities, concentrated in an
archipelago of densely populated blue cities,” while the Republican Party
became “predominantly a Midwestern, white working-class party with its
geographic epicenter in the South and interior West.”
For Lind,
the driving force for the shift was the “culture war” over issues of
“sexuality, gender or reproduction” that took place between religious
conservatives and secular liberals over the last 40 years. Cultural conservatives migrated to the
Republican party while people with a more secular outlook migrated to the
Democratic party.
For neither
group of migrants was their new party a blank slate. Newly arrived Democrats found a party focused
on the working class economic issues that gave rise to Franklin Roosevelt’s
Democratic coalition while newly arrived Republicans found a party with policies
less favorable to them than to the affluent business-oriented partisans they
would eventually displace.
Donald
Trump’s capture of the Republican party marks the beginning of what Lind calls
a policy realignment in which parties shed past policy commitments they made to
people who no longer control the party in favor of commitments to the people
who do.
For
example, Lind notes that for the last couple of decades, Republican politicians
have called for the restructuring of Social Security, ostensibly to make the
program more solvent, but more practically, to avoid having to raise taxes on
the wealthy to pay for it. Donald Trump,
on the other hand has said he would leave the program exactly as it is, without
benefit cutbacks or increases in the retirement age.
Similarly,
the Republican establishment, for economic and political reasons, favors a
light touch on immigration policies that allow for guest and specialized workers,
and some accommodation for the undocumented workers who are already here. But Republican voters have enthusiastically
supported Donald Trump’s plan to deport all undocumented aliens, build a wall
along our border with Mexico and prevent Muslims from entering the U.S. until
we are certain that they are not terrorists.
Lind’s
Democratic example is less convincing.
He points to a disconnect between the attitudes of Democratic voters
toward free trade—53% of all Democratic voters and 67% of millennials (who, he
notes tend to favor Democrats) think free trade is good for the U.S.—while
Democratic politicians like Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton, are currently
opposing new free trade deals in solidarity with working class voters who have
already migrated to the Republican party.
When the
dust settles, Lind thinks we’ll have a Republican party that will be composed
of southern, western, suburban and exurban working class whites who will favor
“universal contributory social insurance systems that benefit them and their
families and reward work effort, but oppose “means tested programs for the poor
whose benefits they and families cannot enjoy.”
They will also continue to oppose legal and illegal immigration “because
of ethnic prejudice” or “fear of economic competition.”
The
Democratic coalition “will be even more of an alliance of upscale, progressive
whites with blacks and Latinos, based in large and diverse cities.” They’ll embrace free trade, oppose universal
social insurance, but they “will agree to moderately redistributive taxes which
pay for means tested benefits . . . for the disproportionately poor and foreign
born urban workforce.” Lind thinks they’ll
support “employer-friendly, and finance-friendly libertarianism” just as the
Republicans now do.
I think
Lind’s got it wrong.
First of
all, the engine that moved people from one party to the other was not the
culture war. It was race. Harry Truman
nearly lost the 1948 election because of an intraparty rebellion staged by
white Democratic southerners who couldn’t abide Truman’s racial policies. The apocryphal story about Lyndon Johnson’s
remarks about how the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would cost the Democrats the
“Solid South” have proved prophetic in that now, Dixie has become a Republican
bastion.
It’s more historically accurate to say that
the Republican Party became more culturally conservative because of its influx
of southern whites fleeing a more racially diverse Democratic party than it is
to say that the Republicans became the party of whites because of an influx of cultural
conservatives fleeing a more secular Democratic party. The culture war didn’t get started in earnest
until at least the Carter Administration over 10 years after the southern
exodus from the Democratic party began.
Second,
Lind doesn’t properly account for our changing demographics. He discounts the idea that whites will become
a minority in the foreseeable future.
Most of the population growth projected in the nonwhite population will
come from Hispanics, who, he notes, are now beginning to count themselves as white and Hispanic. “If
increasing numbers of Hispanics identify as white and their descendants are
defined as “white” in government statistics,” he argues, there may be a white
majority in the U.S. throughout the 21st century.” Seeing themselves as white, Lind intimates, they
may very well feel comfortable moving to the Republican party.
The problem
with this second argument is that it fails to accept the fact that a
significant proportion of whites simply don’t accept anyone who isn’t actually
white and protestant as a legitimate American. And until they do, it’s not likely that the
voters behind the Republican party are going to adopt the kinds of policies
that will make people of Hispanic ancestry want to support Republican
politicians regardless of how they identify themselves to the Census Bureau.
That racism
or xenophobia, of course, will at least lock the Republican party out of the
White House indefinitely if it continues to define itself with policies in
opposition to people without the same pedigrees its white members have. It remains to be seen whether an American
political party without a realistic chance of winning the Presidency can
survive as a local or Congress-based
party.
It seems to me to be far more likely that
sooner or later, strategic politicians in the Republican party will have little
choice but to drop their dependence on disgruntled whites. They will have no choice but to become
advocates of policies that can attract non-whites on some ground that also
appeal to whites. At the very least,
they’ll have to stop opposing policies that offer assistance to people whose
recent ethnicity doesn’t derive from northern and western Europe.
If that
happens, the new group of voters Republicans need to compete for the presidency
will displace the current shrinking core group of racially motived Republican
whites. Those new voters—the younger
ones in particular—are likely to have little interest in relitigating the culture
war issues that Lind describes.
With race
finally neutralized, we’ll hear fewer arguments against redistribution in favor
of the “undeserving
poor.” Without culture on the menu,
the electorate can spend more time thinking about what a Supreme Court
nominee’s attitude about the ability of the state to control concentrated
economic power and less time worrying about his or her attitudes about
abortion, religion and LBGT rights. There will be less to distract voters from the
economic agenda of the people who are currently bankrolling both political
parties.
And maybe,
just maybe, we’ll be able to negotiate a social compact that enables us to
share the bounty of this country fairly, enables every person to make the most
of his or her life, and makes us more of a nation.