The The New York Times published a
blockbuster social science story last Monday about a study completed by Nobel laureate Angus Deaton and Anne Case. Drs. Deaton and Case found that mortality
rates had spiked for whites who are between 45 and 54 years old. That spike was largely confined to people
without any college education and bucked mortality trends for all other races
and age groups, both in the United States and in other developed countries.
Tragically,
the increased death rate was the result of suicides, drug overdoses and chronic
liver disease, which is generally associated with alcohol abuse. By contrast, death from lung cancer has
trended down for this group while deaths from diabetes associated with obesity
have remained flat.
I was
prepared to write an article like the one Harold Meyerson of the Washington Post wrote on Thursday. He tied this spike in white
middle age death to a narrative about the job loss and economic impotence of
people who thought that they would be able to maintain a middle class life
style by parlaying their high school diplomas into secure jobs in manufacturing
and construction, just like their mothers and fathers had.
In
Meyerson’s narrative, the deaths are a natural result of the angst people
experience when they lose their jobs and realize that, for them, the American
Dream is a chimera. They realize that
they are not going to do better than their parents and that they can expect to
finish their lives on the brink of poverty.
They numb their existential pain with drugs and alcohol, or they end them with suicide.
For good
measure, Meyerson points out the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump
draws much of his political support from non-hispanic whites who have high
school degrees or less. Support for
Trump and the high death toll for this group, he says, share common roots: “a
sense of abandonment, betrayal and misdirected rage.”
As I started to write, though, it occurred to
me that Meyerson’s narrative left too many questions unanswered. First of all, as the Times points out, while the trend
for middle aged is going in an unfortunate direction, middle aged blacks still
have a much higher death rate than do whites.
The death rate for middle-aged African-Americans is 581 per 100,000, 166
per 100,000 higher than the 415 per 100,000 applicable for middle-aged whites.
The Meyerson
narrative doesn’t even mention this fact, nor does he ask why there is a
difference between white middle-class mortality and black middle-class mortality. I suppose it’s newsworthy when a mortality
trend reverses itself, but it’s downright embarrassing when a story about
middle-aged whites receives vast media attention and the story about
abbreviated African-American longevity never even got written. Middle-aged black mortality doesn’t appear
relevant to the larger political narrative.
Do their lives not matter?
What’s also
missing, though, is any analysis of where these deaths are coming from. Deaton and Case provide one tantalizing
graph, which I reproduce here, that sheds some light on this.
Each point on the graph represents a year and one of the country’s four census
regions: blue for the Northeast, red for the Midwest, black for the South and
green for the West.
While all
regions show increases in mortality due to suicide and drug overdoses, the
death rates in the Northeast and the Midwest seem to lag those in the South and
the Midwest. The worst year for these
kinds of deaths in the Northeast and the Midwest was 2013. But the South and the West had already
reached this level of death for these causes in 2007 and 2005 respectively.
Why did
life get harder for middle-aged whites living in the South and the West sooner
than it did for middle-aged whites living in the Northeast and the Midwest? Why
do things get much worse in the South after 2005 and the West after 2007? Is there something going on at the state or
local level that is either making mortality rates from drug abuse and suicide
worse in the South and in the West or is there something happening in the
Northeast and the Midwest that is putting a lid on the problem there?
And
finally, why have the mortality trends reversed themselves only for middle-aged
whites with no college experience? It’s easy to jump to the conclusion, as the Meyerson
narrative does, that folks who haven’t been to college are more likely to
experience joblessness or economic dislocation leading to poverty and
hopelessness than their better-educated peers. But, is that really the whole
answer?
How can we explain
the fact that, according to the study, people who have taken some college
coursework but didn’t graduate from college are doing much better than
middle-aged whites with no college experience?
Why should a college dropout, someone who has obviously failed at
something big, be less likely to die in middle-age by suicide or drug overdose
than his or her peer with only a high school diploma? Are his or her life prospects really that
much better? Is there something about an
abbreviated college experience than helps to immunize a person against suicide
and death by drug addiction at middle-age, or is it the willingness to try to
get a college education that does the trick?
Good
science is all about generating good questions. Deaton and Case have just contributed
more than their share. Questions such as
the ones I’ve just asked should keep social scientists busy for a good long
time.
Their
answers are clearly matters of life and death.
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